North Korea: Breaking The Impasse

North Korea has once again raised international tensions with its sixth and most powerful nuclear test. In Washington, President Donald Trump reacted quickly calling North Korea a rogue nation that continues to be hostile and dangerous to the United States. He also said “Appeasement with North Korea will not work, they only understand one thing”. In August Trump vowed to stop North Korea if it didn’t stop its nuclear development. Describing the test as a “perfect success”, North Korea announced on state television that it had tested a hydrogen bomb designed for use on its new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Japanese and South Korean officials say the test registered as an earthquake about ten times more powerful than North Korea’s last nuclear test a year ago. North Korea’s test on the 5^th of September 2016 registered 5.0 on the Richter Scale. The U.S. Geological Survey measured the quake at 6.3 suggesting that North Korea either has a hydrogen bomb or is close to one. A Norwegian agency that monitors earthquakes, NOSAR, estimates the yield of the underground explosion at 120 kilotonnes. That’s six to eight times the yield of the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of the Second World War. There is no independent confirmation that the detonation was a hydrogen bomb. Other world leaders have also reacted to North Korea’s latest underground nuclear test. In Seoul, President Moon Jae-in said South Korea would push for new UN sanctions, and stronger steps to further isolate North Korea. Japan wants further restrictions on oil shipments to North Korea. China strongly condemned the nuclear tests, and called on North Korea to end its “wrong actions.” Great Britain and Germany have called for stronger sanctions against North Korea. In Paris, President Emmanuel Macron called on the international community to react firmly to North Korea’s “new provocation”. Russia warned that North Korea risked serious consequences, and called for restraint on all sides to avoid further escalation.

The underground test comes after Pyongyang conducted two missile tests in July. One of the missiles landed almost one thousand kilometres away in the Sea of Japan. North Korea then claimed its missiles could reach the United States. International experts are divided. Some say the altitude and distance of the missile shows North Korea can hit the US. Others say North Korean missiles can only reach the US if they use payloads lighter than Pyongyang is able to produce. To reach the United States, a missile would have to travel in a long arc that would take it into space. A warhead on the missile would then have to survive re-entry into the earth’s atmosphere. So far, none of North Korea’s tests has revealed such a capacity. Developing a hydrogen bomb would give North Korea a lighter warhead. It’s not the first time North Korea has claimed to have tested a hydrogen bomb. The first such test was on the 6^th of January 2015. Monitoring stations from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation were unable to say with clarity that a hydrogen bomb was detonated.

Thermo-nuclear bombs

The tests on the 3rd of September 2017 had a higher yield. A Washington-based physicist says this high a yield “would likely require thermonuclear material”. David Albright, who is also founder of the non-profit Institute for Science and International Security, questions whether the detonation came from a two-stage nuclear bomb, or used fissile material to create a larger explosion. North Korea maintains it was a two-stage thermonuclear explosion. A hydrogen bomb uses a primary atomic bomb to trigger a second much larger explosion. The first stage splits atoms by using nuclear fission, the second by nuclear fusion. Chang Young-keun of the Korea Aerospace University says that creates fast neutrons, which then bombard the uranium inside the bomb. This causes an explosion hundreds of times greater. North Korea’s official news agency also mentioned the possibility of detonating a bomb in the atmosphere to create an electromagnetic pulse, or EMP. That would create a power surge, crippling the US electric grid.

Where Do We Go From Here?

It has been stated repeatedly that the 1950-53 Korean War ended with the signing of a truce, not a peace treaty, and that the two Koreas are still technically at war. North Korea regularly threatens to attack the south, and its main ally, the United States. The accumulation of tests and failed efforts over the years shows that North Korea is focused on becoming a full nuclear power so it can defend itself against US aggression. After years of international efforts at the six-party talks (North and South Korea, Japan, China, Russia and the United States) and little lasting progress to show for it, the political and public mood has turned from despair to fear and anger.

There appear to be three options: the use of conventional military force, containment, and diplomacy. The worst thing about the situation at the moment is lack of clarity. The sense of not knowing how far a person will go, or when, can be unnerving and provocative underlining the need for strong, steady, informed leadership. It’s difficult to know if President Trump is playing to his supporters, or simply letting Americans know that he is aware of the situation, and looking for a solution. His words may be meant as an ultimatum to force China or Russia to rein in Kim Jong-un, otherwise he will. Trump might be hinting at possible options, and watching to see how people react to his words. Phrases such as “fire and fury like the world has never seen”, and “they only understand one thing” may seem clear and strongly suggest a military option. However, given the consequences, they leave little room for other options.

It is increasingly common to see media reports alluding to Kim Jong-un as being irrational. Accepting such a phrase assumes that it’s pointless to talk with him because he only understands force. Such a phrase quickly leads to talk of “pre-emptive strike”. People reveal their frustration, fear and anger with such phrases. Such talk may help a person feel justified, but it blinds people to the real cost of such action. Conventional warfare is likely to trigger a nuclear conflict resulting in the death of millions of people in the Korean Peninsula, possibly along North Korea’s border with China, and certainly in Japan. Attacking a country that has devoted itself to acquiring nuclear arms to the detriment of its own people does not seem a wise option.

On the surface, a non-military option such as containment appears to be better than a pre-emptive strike. Using the South Korean, US, Chinese, Russian, and Japanese militaries to enforce more sanctions is decidedly less drastic than nuclear conflict. However, years of sanctions have not prevented North Korea from acquiring nuclear technology. At times sanctions have seemingly worked. In September 1999, Pyongyang agreed to continue high-level talks with Washington, and to suspend long-range missile tests for the duration of the talks. In return, the United States promised it would partially lift economic sanctions on North Korea. Nine months later in June 2000 North and South Korea agreed to work on reunification. They also agreed to economic and cultural exchanges, and to reunite families divided by the Korean War. The United States responded by relaxing sanctions. This enabled greater trade in commercial and consumer goods, easier investment, and direct personal and commercial transactions. A day later North Korea reaffirmed its moratorium on missile tests. That same month, a US National Intelligence Estimate said that North Korea would most likely develop a missile that could carry a warhead to the United States mainland by 2015.

What Does Kim Jong-un Want?

The third option, diplomacy, requires knowing what Kim Jong-un wants. Looking at the recent history of North Korea reveals a fair amount of information. Kim Jong-un spent his early years in power by getting rid of potential rivals. That suggests that he considers his personal security as a way to not only stay in power, but to maintain stability in the country. Like his father before him, Kim Jong-un has consistently worked to acquire nuclear capability as a deterrent to US aggression. Such capability would also enable North Korea to command more respect in the rest of the world. Looking at the United States from the North Korean point of view, only Washington can end North Korea’s economic isolation, gradually letting it reduce its dependence on China so it can establish relations with other countries.

To list all the various stages of talks, advances, retreats, successes and failures between North Korea and the United States over the past few years would fill several pages. However, in going through North Korea’s history of nuclear tests, sanctions and brinksmanship with the west, it is clear that North Korea has a sense of Realpolitik. It knows what it wants, and plays hard to get it. Diplomacy is a chess game at the best of times. In the case of North Korea, the game reveals an almost pathological need to obtain what it wants. In true cat and mouse style, North Korea has surprised the west on several occasions with an unexpected willingness to negotiate. This was evident in efforts to work on reunification of the Korean Peninsula at the turn of the century. This reveals a desire to rebuild its economy, to establish a positive relationship with the rest of the world, provided it obtains certain things in return. The key to resolving such brinksmanship is to negotiate a face-saving way for both sides to let North Korea have access to the funding it needs to build its economy. By promoting positive links between North Korea and other countries, the establishment of commercial trade with other countries will end the need for North Korea to sell nuclear technology to such states as Iran, Yemen and Syria.

Diplomacy is not selling the farm for a few fancy baubles. Negotiation is willingness to lose certain things in exchange for an agreement that helps all sides. It means hard choices. Persuading North Korea to gradually phase out its nuclear programme and rejoin the Nuclear Non-Proliferation agreement in return for long-term prosperity and eventual peace is far preferable to mistake-prone exchanges between Presidents Trump and Kim Jong-un. The west will have to set a good example by honouring its negotiated commitments. Without the threat of nuclear holocaust, negotiators can then make adjustments. North Korea might even be allowed the same “recessed deterrence” granted to its age-old nemesis Japan, that is, keeping the ability to build a nuclear weapon if other western states fail to honour their commitments. When the leaders of two countries each have their hands on their respective nuclear buttons, the question becomes who acts first. The alternative is for each to sit down at the same table and find a way to let the other have what it wants.